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METHOD IN CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY: A REPLY 
Alvin Plantinga 
First, I wish to thank Professor Keller for his thoughtful and interesting comment 
on my advice to Christian philosophers. In offering that advice I was hoping 
that Christian philosophers would turn explicit attention to this problem-the 
problem of how to be a Christian in philosophy. I am therefore delighted to see 
that Professor Keller has done precisely that. 
I am sorry to say, however, that I shall have to disappoint those of you who 
hope for a knock-down drag-out brawl; I find myself in pretty complete agreement 
with Keller on most of the substantive issues. Perhaps a real disagreement or 
two may lurk somewhere nearby, but I have been hard put to identify them. It 
does seem to me, however, that at several points Keller has misunderstood or 
misinterpreted what I said or meant to say; no doubt this is due as much to 
expository deficiency on my part as to hermeneutical inadequacy on his. I am 
therefore pleased to have the opportunity to explain myself a bit more fully; 
once these misunderstandings are out of the way, perhaps we shall be able to 
see whether or not we have any real disagreement. 
But first a brief recap of what it was, as I see it, that I offered by way of 
advice. What I said, essentially, is that Christian philosophers should exhibit 
more autonomy, and more integrality. First, Christians should not automatically 
take over the research programs, to use the Lakatosian phrase, popular at the 
great contemporary centers of phi losophy. This is for two reasons: (a) the Christian 
philosophical community has its own questions, its own topics and its own 
concerns. If Christian philosophers pay attention only to what is currently fash-
ionable in the philosophical academy generally, they will neglect an important 
part of their task as Christian philosophers. And a part of this task-an important 
and substantially neglected part of this task-is the job of working out answers 
from an explicitly Christian 0f theistic perspective to the sorts of questions 
philosophers ask and answer. (b) Christian philosophers ought not automatically 
take over these research projects, because many of them have deeply anti-Chris-
tian roots; they fit in badly with a Christian or theistic way of looking at the 
world. Then secondly, I said that Christian philosophers have a perfect right to 
start with the views they hold as Christians; these, I said, are quite as suitable 
as starting points for philosophical inquiry as the naturalistic perspective from 
which most contemporary philosophers do in fact start. Christian philosophers, 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 5 No.2 April 1988 
All rights reserved. 
159 
160 Faith and Philosophy 
I said, are under no obligation first to prove that theism follows from or is 
probable with respect to premisses widely accepted in the contemporary secular 
philosophical academy before trying to work out its implications for epistemology 
and ontology, for ethics and logic, for aesthetics and philosophy of mathematics. 
Now where (if at all) do Keller and I disagree? He attributes two principles 
to me. First, Christian philosophers have or should have their own agenda and 
their own research projects; here Keller agrees. The other principle he attributes 
to me is that Christian philosophers should, in his words, "do their philosophizing 
in light of the fundamental beliefs which they have as members of the Christian 
community, not in light of the fundamental beliefs of the philosophers who 
happen to be the current 'bright lights' of philosophy" (p. 145). Well, I did 
indeed say something like that, and it still seems to me to be both true and good 
advice. Where does Keller object? "Nevertheless," he says, "I do not think it is 
wise for us Christians to follow his other principle, at least as he develops it in 
his examples. What I find lacking in his principle and his examples is a discussion 
of the role that beliefs of our contemporary intellectual community (which I shall 
term 'secular beliefs') can and should play in modifying our Christian beliefs. 
I think that one's Christian beliefs and these secular beliefs should be related in 
a far more dialectical fashion than Plantinga seems to suggest" (p. 145). 
So perhaps we could put Keller's main point by saying that our Christian 
beliefs and our secular beliefs should be related dialectically. This means, says 
Keller, "that neither one should automatically always be given precedence"; it 
could be, for example, that there are some secular beliefs that we should hold 
more firmly than some Christian beliefs, so that if the secular and Christian 
belief conflict, then the Christian belief should be modified. Or perhaps it might 
be that a pair of my Christian beliefs might conflict in the presence of some 
secular belief; then it is possible that I should give up or modify one of the 
Christian beliefs. It isn't automatically the case that the secular belief should 
give way. 
Now this seems to be both eminently sensible and quite correct. "Secular 
beliefs" as Keller thinks of them, comprise something like the beliefs widely 
shared by our contemporaries, or perhaps contemporary western intellectuals; 
they would therefore include among other things a good bit of logic, mathematics, 
current science, history, common sense beliefs such as that there are material 
objects and that there has been a past, and the like. And I quite agree that if 
one of my Christian beliefs conflicts with one of these beliefs, then it could be 
that the Christian belief should be modified. If, for example, it becomes clear 
that my version of the Christian doctrine of the atonement is inconsistent, or is 
inconsistent with some obviously true ethical principle, then my understanding 
of God's atoning activity might very well require modification. Suppose my 
understanding of the doctrine of creation involves the idea that the world was 
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created no more than 6,000 years ago: if I encounter excellent evidence for the 
proposition that the earth is much older than that, then perhaps the right thing 
to do is to modify my view of creation, as well as my view as to what it is that 
the Lord intends to teach us in Genesis. 
But this is entirely consistent with the idea that a Christian philosopher perfectly 
properly starts from his beliefs as a Christian; and here we come to what I see 
as misunderstanding. These misunderstandings have to do, fundamentally, with 
what it means to say that one startsJrom a certain belief, or properly startsJrom 
a certain belief in conducting philosophical inquiry. I say Christian philosophers 
can and should start from what they believe as Christians; Keller apparently 
understands me here, as suggesting three things. First, if Christian philosophers 
start from their beliefs as Christians, then they should not also start from other 
sorts of beliefs; second, if someone properly starts from a given belief, then he 
will not or will not properly modify that belief in the light of other beliefs; and 
third, one must accord the same weight to all the beliefs one starts with. My 
reason for thinking Keller understands me this way is that otherwise I cannot 
see why he thinks what he says is incompatible with my advice. 
But in fact I don't mean to endorse any of these suggestions-not at all. First, 
to say that one can properly start from a given sort of belief is not to suggest 
that one cannot also start from some other beliefs. The beliefs one starts from, 
in a philosophical inquiry, constitute the initial constraints on the sorts of answers 
one will explore and accept; they constitute the views and beliefs one initially 
takes for granted in attacking the problem. But then one might have initial 
constraints of many different sorts: obvious logical and ethical principles, some 
mathematics, perhaps some set theory, perhaps some contemporary science, and 
of course obvious philosophical principles, as well as one's Christian beliefs. 
So to say that we ought to start from our Christian beliefs is not to say that we 
ought to start from nothing but those beliefs. Indeed, it is hard to see how that 
would be so much as a possibility. Wouldn't we at least also have co start from 
logic? 
Second, a corollary of this point: to say that I start from a certain set of beliefs 
is not to say that I weight all of these beliefs equally. These beliefs constitute 
a mixed bag, and I will be very much more certain of some of them than of 
others. I may be very sure of modus ponens, but less sure of, say, contemporary 
physical theories, even though I start from both. But then the fact I propose to 
start from my beliefs as a Christian does not mean that I will weight each of my 
Christian beliefs more heavily than any secular belief, in Keller's sense of secular. 
Thus, for example, I will not weight my own understanding of the atonement 
or original sin as heavily as modus ponens or elementary arithmetic. 
And third, still another corollary: the fact that one starts from a given belief 
does not mean that that belief is above criticism and cannot properly be modified 
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by further inquiry. I may start from my understanding of original sin or divine 
election, say; but by virtue of further reflection I can perfectly properly come 
to modify it. Perhaps I see, for example, that it is incompatible with the conjunc-
tion of the idea that God is just together with certain obvious principles of justice. 
As I see it, therefore, a Christian philosopher should start both from her beliefs 
as a Christian, but also from beliefs of other sorts, including philosophical beliefs. 
And of course one should try to put them together, to understand them in the 
light of each other. Keller points out that Aquinas used philosophical ideas in 
an effort to deepen our understanding of the Christian faith; and he adds, "I 
cannot help wondering whether he would even have attempted his bold under-
taking if he had heard and followed Plantinga's advice." But, if I may put it so, 
I cannot help wondering why Keller wonders. I accept general revelation as well 
as special revelation; I did not mean to suggest, nor did I suggest, that philosoph-
ical ideas should not be employed in trying to reach a deeper understanding of 
the Christian faith. Indeed, what else is there to use? 
So to start from the beliefs one holds as a Christian is not to start from nothing 
else and is not to hold these beliefs in such a way as to be invulnerable to 
criticism. Of course not. If I find good reason to modify my understanding of 
the Christian faith, then (so far forth) I should do so. "Good reason" could come 
from many sources: logic, obvious ethical principles, common sense beliefs of 
various kinds, science, and the like; and it was no part of my advice to suggest 
otherwise. My advice was aimed in quite a different direction. I meant to say, 
for one thing, that the mere fact that Christian supernaturalism, or some aspects 
of it, is rejected at leading centers of philosophy as obviously outmoded and 
destined for history's junk yard, or as inappropriate for man come of age-that 
fact is nothing against it and should not deter the Christian philosopher from 
taking the view in question as a starting point for philosophical inquiry. If some 
part of Christian supernaturalism leads to trouble, then no doubt we should 
modify it: sure enough. But the fact that many contemporary philosophers reject 
it out of hand is not in itself already trouble. There are indeed many philosophers 
who reject Christian supernaturalism; that is deplorable, but it is not news and 
it should not deter Christian philosophers from pursuing their vocations in Chris-
tian philosophy. Philosophy is many things; among other things it is an attempt 
to work out a vision-a quasi-religious or theological vision of man and world 
and the place of the former in the latter. Many or most of our contemporaries 
are animated by a vision quite different from the Christian or theistic one; and 
their research programs as well as the assumptions underlying their research 
programs comport ill with a theistic way of looking at the world. I say these 
research programs and assumptions have no claim on a Christian philosopher 
just by virtue of their current popularity; she can quite properly reject them just 
because they do cont1ict with a theistic view of the world. She needn't first 
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show, from some allegedly neutral starting point, that these assumptions are 
false. She has a perfect right to get on with her own research projects, with 
developing and articulating a Christian view of God and man and the world, 
even if that enterprise presupposes what most contemporary philosophers reject. 
I say the Christian philosopher has a right and, indeed, a duty to do exactly this. 
There are at least three kinds of projects, I think, that we Christian philosophers 
should pursue in a more determined and explicit way than we have been doing. 
First, there is philosophical reflection on specifically Christian topics-Trinity, 
Incarnation, Atonement, Sin (both the original and the less creative varieties), 
Election, and the like. Second, there is examining and criticizing contemporary 
ideas from an explicitly Christian and theistic perspective. Third and perhaps 
. most important, or at any rate most difficult, there is developing from a theistic 
perspective a full-orbed, articulate, systematic set of answers to the main philo-
sophical questions. 
But here I have no reason to think Keller and I disagree. By way of conclusion, 
then, let me mention a couple of points where perhaps we do disagree. First, I 
think it is a mistake to hold that according to the whole Thomistic tradition "to 
whatever extent we understand God, we do so by analogy with creatures; we 
cannot reverse that project" (p. 153). If this is what the whole Thomistic tradition 
holds, then Thomas Aquinas, so far as I can see, is not much of a Thomist. 
Aquinas held that much of what we understand about God, we learn by revelation, 
and not from analogizing God to ourselves. Furthermore, Aquinas also held that 
God is simple, impassive, outside of time, and immutable; according to him we 
don't learn these things by seeing God as analogous to us, but by deducing them 
from the fact that God is the unconditioned creator of the universe. 
A second place where perhaps we disagree: Keller seems to suggest that we 
cannot properly reject a proposed hermeneutical technique or a proposed principle 
of historical investigation just because it conflicts with the Christian faith as we 
understand it: this means "that we must decide on the acceptability of techniques 
on the same basis as our non-Christian colleagues decide." This seems to me 
to be an error, at least if I understand it. Techniques and hermeneutical prin-
ciples, obviously enough, are not theologically neutral. Suppose someone 
proposes a hermeneutical principle according to which it could not be the case 
that certain writings were divinely inspired in a way that other human productions 
are not; and suppose the fundamental motivation for accepting this principle is 
just incredulity that there could be such a person as traditional Christians consider 
God to be-someone who proposes to reveal himself in a special way through 
the Bible. More realistically, suppose someone suggests that in interpreting the 
New Testament, we must assume that any authentic saying of Jesus would have 
to reflect the cultural patterns of early Palestine.' Such principles would have 
little claim on Christians, even if they were widely accepted by our non-Christian 
164 Faith and Philosophy 
coJIeagues. Our non-Christian colleagues, indeed, might accept this principle 
just because they are indeed non-Christian colleagues; but a Christian has a right 
to decide on its acceptability in quite a different way. She would have a perfect 
right, I should think, to reject it just because it conflicts with the Christian 
understanding of God, his revelation, and Jesus Christ. Of course if there were 
some powerful arguments for such principles-some arguments distinct from 
the mere fact that they fit well with certain contemporary views as to what kind 
of a God, if any, there might be-then these arguments must be taken account 
of. But in the absence of such arguments, it seems to me quite proper for a 
traditional Christian thinker to reject the principle just because it conflicts with 
traditional Christianity. And this is true even if the principle in question is 
accepted by the vast majority of the experts. Christians are not obliged to accept 
just any historical or hermeneutical methods, even if they are widely popular 
among our contemporaries. We must test the spirits, not automatically invite 
them in just because they are decked out in the latest academic rega' ia. 2 
One final point: different advice is appropriate at different times and places. 
The sort of advice appropriate for Parisian Catholics of the 1930's and 40's or 
Amsterdam Calvinists of the 30's, 40's and 50's might be quite different from 
the advice I gave. But my advice was for contemporary American Christian 
philosophers. It isn't necessary, I think, to advise them to philosophize in the 
light of secular beliefs; here what is needed (as I see it, at any rate) is the sort 
of advice I gave. 
University of Notre Dame 
NOTES 
I. See my "Sheehan's Shenanigans," The Reformed Journal, April, 1987, p. 23. 
2. Another point on which perhaps we have a real disagreement has to do with agent causation 
and the role of theological considerations here; my comment, however, is already entirely too long; 
I shall therefore leave these points for another time. 
